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Abstract 
 Following a bloodless coup d'état in 1965, the Democratic Republic of the Congo's new 
leader, Mobutu Sese Seko, was faced with a number of objectives, the most important of which was 
the creation of a unified Congolese identity, which would help to prevent the return to political 
infighting that marked the first five post-independence years. After all, the DRC is a country that is 
made up of many different tribes and languages, hence the creation of the unified identity was not 
an easy feat. Authenticité — a return to ancestral roots that would take the country forward —, 
renaming the country Zaire, and putting himself in the position of messianic figurehead were all just 
vehicles through which Mobutu sought to create this identity while at the same time firmly 
entrenching his own authority. At the same time, however, religious actors such as the Catholic 
church and the Kimbanguist church also played their part in uniting the Zairean people under one 
umbrella. Especially the efforts of the Catholic church were not always appreciated by Mobutu and 
the two often went head to head during the latter's time in power. In contemporary Congo, Mobutu 
and his ideology of Mobutism are often held to be two out of a myriad of reasons for the current 
instability, while the Catholic church is still mending the wounds. Nonetheless, by connecting the 
evidence from the past to the situation of the present, this thesis will show that all three 
aforementioned actors  nonetheless perform a crucial role in ensuring that the country does not 
completely disintegrate. 
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Introduction 
 Mobutu Sese Seko Kuku Ngbendu Wa Za Banga, the man originally known by the simpler 
name Joseph-Désiré Mobutu, is notorious for being the textbook-example of a Cold War dictator. 
Through a bloodless coup d'état staged in 1965 in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), he 
brought an end to the Congo Crisis, one of the Cold War's many proxy wars. From then on, he ruled 
the nation with an iron fist for more than thirty years. The DRC transformed into a one-party state 
named Zaire between 1971 and 1997. Mobutu exploited the country's vast natural resources for his 
personal enrichment, while the Congolese people were suffering, and his regime was propped up by 
the United States all the way through for his harsh stance on communism. Many scholars seem to 
agree that the destructive and kleptocratic nature of his rule is to blame for the Congo's 
contemporary instability. Nevertheless, to briefly return to the Congo Crisis: Mobutu was faced 
with an important task as the country's new leader. As the DRC was still a relatively young state, he 
was beset with the construction of a new Congolese identity, with which he could definitively lift 
the country out of the colonial era. It is exactly this identity construction process which will serve as 
the focal point of this thesis.  
 In 1960, President Joseph Kasavubu and Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba, had to consider 
the political structure that was to be given to their newly independent country. Kasavubu, for 
instance, led the Association des Bakongo (ABAKO), which was destined specifically for the 
Bakongo people and supported a federalist structure for the DRC.  The Mouvement National 1
Congolais-Kalonji (MNC-K), a split-off from the original MNC led by Lumumba, was another 
example of a party that represented the interests of one particular ethnic group, being the Baluba 
from the Congo's south. It is clear that the tribal divisions typified by the new political parties of the 
First Republic were a major facet in the ensuing Congo Crisis. Undoubtedly, Mobutu saw the 
 "Congo Crisis", The Polynational War Memorial, accessed September 7, 2017, http://www.war-memorial.net/Congo-1
Crisis-3.128.
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removal of tribal tensions as one of his primary tasks upon seizing power for good in 1965. A major 
step in this process was rebranding the Democratic Republic of the Congo into 'Zaire,' paired with a 
new anthem and flag — symbols behind which an entire population could rally together as one. 
Seen from a broader perspective, we can identify Mobutism and Authenticité, as being the key 
ideologies and instruments by which Mobutu and his political party, the Mouvement Populaire de la 
Révolution (MPR), sought to instill a greater sense of nationhood upon the population. 
 In spite of the nation-building efforts spearheaded by Mobutu and the MPR, the political 
arena was not the only location where Zairean identity formation was taking place. Throughout the 
years, the Catholic church also undertook steps to unite Congolese people with a wide variety of 
tribal backgrounds. This is partly reflected in the Congo's present-day status as a deeply Catholic 
nation, with over 35 percent of its inhabitants subscribing to this denomination of Christianity. 
Another religious actor that was active in the nation-building process was the Kimbanguist church, 
a faith that is indigenous to the Congo, and which still enjoys a sizable following today. During his 
reign, Mobutu often found himself at odds with the Catholic church, but not as much with the 
Kimbanguist church, and part of the objective of this thesis is to uncover the reasons behind this.  
 The question of Congolese nation-building is relevant for understanding the civil wars that 
still plague the Congo today. Not a day goes by where inhabitants in (particularly) the DRC's 
eastern and southern region are forced to flee their homes, or are even killed. It is in these regions 
that rebel groups literally and figuratively call the shots. The problematic circumstances of the civil 
war are largely caused by the poor governance of current President Joseph Kabila; as stated by 
Global Security: "absent a hegemon, the Congo provides endless opportunities for plunder."  Given 2
that these conflicts play out along ethnic lines, one would be lead to assume that the nation-building 
project of the latter half of the 20th century has failed. However, despite the deplorable day-to-day 
 "Congo Civil War", Global Security, accessed September 12, 2017, https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/2
congo.htm.
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situation, the research will show that this quick conclusion is uncorroborated. Therefore, this thesis 
will link the historical efforts to the contemporary situation, and thereby show that the past helps us 
to better understand the present. 
 Before treating the subject matter, the existing scholarship must first be examined. Two 
concepts closely correlated to nation-building — state-building and identity politics — will feature 
in this review, as these terms are often jumbled together in academic and policy circles. Beyond the 
triad of identity politics—nation-building—state-building, the review of the academic literature will 
also look at the clash between religion and nationalistic discourse. Next, the section on research 
design will explain in more detail the principal research question, whereafter the three 'substantial' 
chapters will delve into the differing degrees of success the three actors under study — Mobutu, the 
Catholic church, and the Kimbanguist church — had in the nation-building exercise. 
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Review of the academic literature 
 The aim of this literature review is to embed the current research in the academic field, in 
relation to concepts such as nation-building, state-building, and identity politics, as well as other 
key concepts that are crucial to analyzing Mobutu's time as dictator. Based on the existing work, we 
can identify how in particular this thesis will add to enhancing our knowledge on these topics.  
Nations, nationalism, and nation-building 
 French historian Ernest Renan is one of the most renowned authors on the topic of 
nationhood. According to Renan, religion plays an important role in nation formation, especially 
when nations come to be through conquest, as was common in the early modern period. "When 
victor and vanquished have the same religion, or rather when the victor adopts the religion of the 
vanquished, there can be no question of the Turkish system of complete discrimination according to 
a man's religion."  While this theory is perhaps not entirely applicable to the case of the Congo, one 3
could extrapolate the relationship between victor and vanquished, as described by Renan, to the 
relationship between colonial overlord and subject. In terms of religion, the presence and 
perseverance of the Kimbanguist church — despite its regional concentration — can, for example, 
be seen as a unifying factor for Congolese nationhood.  Later on in this thesis, it will indeed be 
shown that Mobutu looked more favorably upon the Kimbanguist church than other religious 
actors, mostly due to Kimbanguism's authentic Congolese grounding.  
 Another seminal work on the concept of 'nation' is Imagined Communities by Benedict 
Anderson. In this volume, he admits that terms like 'nation,' 'nationality' and 'nationalism' are 
difficult to define.  Anderson takes an anthropological stance on nations when he writes that "I 4
 Ernest Renan, "What is a Nation?", in Modern Political Doctrines, ed. Alfred Zimmern (Oxford: Oxford University 3
Press, 1939), 189.
 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (London: Verso, 4
2006), 3.
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propose the following definition of nation: it is an imagined political community — and imagined 
as both inherently limited and sovereign. It is imagined [emphasis in the original] because the 
members of even the smallest nations never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or 
even hear them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion."  Anderson's theory is 5
relevant for understanding the case of the Congo, but seems to lack a focus on top-down approaches 
for the creation of such an imagined community, as was the case with Mobutu's Authenticité efforts. 
His work does point to the challenge faced by most leaders in shaping their nations from the ground 
up: to find the factors that bind the population living in a given territory together. In the case of the 
Congo, however, one can argue that shared history under colonial leadership gives rise to a 
sentiment of shared suffering that, in the end, assists the nation-building process in the post-
independence era. Surely, the process of colonization that started out with the Scramble for Africa, 
helped to create a more concrete image of the otherwise imagined community that is the DRC. 
 A common criticism of academic work on the concept of nation-building is the fact that it 
leaves a country's ethnic diversity out of the equation. Writing in 1972, Connor pointed out that in 
39 out of the 132 'contemporary' states (at the time) — 29.5 percent — the largest ethnic group 
constituted less than half of the state's population. "Moreover, this portrait of ethnic diversity 
becomes more vivid when the number of distinct ethnic groups within states is considered. In some 
instances, the number of groups within a state runs into the hundreds, and in 53 states (40.2 percent 
of the total), the population is divided into more than five significant groups [emphasis in the 
original]."  Fast forwarding to the modern era, we can observe that ethnic diversity around the 6
world has only increased, largely due to the forces of globalization. Moreover, Connor identifies the 
rise of ethnic nationalism as a barrier to the proper functioning of postcolonial African states. By 
means of a 'solution', the mass party (of which Mobutu's MPR is a notable example) is used as "a 
 Ibid., 5-6.5
 Walker Connor, "Nation-Building or Nation-Destroying?". World Politics 24, no. 3 (April 1972): 320.6
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means of masking ethnic rivalry; identification of the individual with the party has been missing."  7
More recent work by Riggs tells us that "Traditionally, language and religion often served as 
markers that distinguished members of dominant communities from others. Such distinctions were 
easily maintained under the caste-like conditions that prevailed when royal sovereignty was seen as 
supernaturally grounded. The secularization inherent in the move from sacred to popular 
sovereignty undermined these distinctions and made them seem increasingly irrational."  While in 8
his research, Riggs refers to democracies (and it would, of course, be problematic to characterize 
Mobutu's Zaire as such), his theory falls short of explaining the situation in post-independence 
Congo and postcolonial states in Africa in general. Especially the case of Zaire shows us that 
religion serves as a unifier rather than a divider. Linguistic differences are indeed applicable to 
Zaire, but so far have not been utilized to great lengths so as to give one ethnic group the upper 
hand over another.  
Bridging the divide with state-building and identity politics 
 It is important to distinguish between 'nation-building' and 'state-building.' The former refers 
to a process of identity formation, which would also be the logical conclusion from the manner in 
which authors like Anderson treats the subject, whereas the latter concerns the construction of a 
functioning state, and is thus more materialist in nature. Theorization on state-building often occurs 
in Weberian terms, where the nature of a state is defined by the existence of a monopoly on the use 
of force. According to Lemay-Hébert, "following a very specific reading of Weber, state institutions 
are autonomized from their societal moorings, allowing scholars to differentiate state-building from 
nation-building activities."  9
 Ibid., 353.7
 Fred W. Riggs, "Globalization, Ethnic Diversity, and Nationalism: the Challenge for Democracies", The Annals of the 8
American Academy of Political and Social Science 581 (May 2002): 39.
 Nicolas Lemay-Hébert, "Rethinking Weberian Approaches to State-building", in The Routledge Handbook of 9
International State-building, eds. Timothy D. Sisk and David Chandler (Abingdon: Routledge, 2013), 11.
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 Placing this debate in an African context, Herbst argues that state-building on the continent 
is difficult due to the forms of governance imposed during the colonial era. The (capital) cities that 
were established in their colonial territories "did not serve as the basis of state creation in the same 
manner as occurred in Europe because the colonizers were not interested in duplicating the power 
infrastructure which bound city to hinterland in their homelands."  Many capitals are based on the 10
ocean, as the Europeans moved them away from the interior, which left the latter neglected. This 
practice continued as independence came around: "The nationalists received states that were 
appropriate to the way they had conducted their politics: primarily urban, with few links to the 
surrounding countryside where most of the population lived. In turn, they furthered the urban bias 
of their states by marginalizing peasant populations and by providing urban groups with privileged 
access to many of the resources allocated by the state."  Especially in its first few post-11
independence years, this theory holds true for the DRC, as well, as the country experienced a 
political fracture between the capital, the east, and the mineral-rich south during the Congo Crisis. 
 Closely linked to notions such as nation-building and state-building is the concept of 
identity politics. As stated in the introduction, it can be argued that the three ideas form a coherent 
triad, due to the constant interlinkage between them. Theorization about identity politics is 
relatively new in academia, tracing its roots to the latter half of the 20th century in the United 
States, with the advent of large-scale political movements focusing on topics such as second wave 
feminism, black civil rights, and gay and lesbian liberation. Despite being far removed in time and 
space from Mobutu's Zaire, one can extend its application to the case currently under study when 
looking at what identity politics entails: "Identity politics starts from analyses of oppression to 
recommend, variously, the reclaiming, redescription, or transformation of previously stigmatized 
accounts of group membership. Rather than accepting the negative scripts offered by a dominant 
 Jeffrey Herbst, "The Challenge of State-Building in Africa", in States and Power in Africa: Comparative Lessons in 10
Authority and Control (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000), 16.
 Ibid., 18.11
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culture about one's own inferiority, one transforms one's own sense of self and community, often 
through consciousness-raising."  Identity politics is not to be confused with the study of political 12
culture. Political culture looks at facets on a national level, such as national values, beliefs, and 
ideology, whereas identity politics looks at those values and orientation within society, i.e. on a sub-
national level.  13
 According to Hobsbawm, collective identities are defined in a negative sense. This reminds 
us of the eternal 'us versus them' principle. "'We' recognize ourselves as 'us' because we are different 
from 'Them'. If there were no 'They' from whom we are different, we would not have to ask 
ourselves who 'We' were."  Whether this description holds true for the DRC is questionable, since 14
identity and belonging in this country is played out along tribal lines. It is these very tribal 
differences that still plague the DRC's east and south today. In the context of Mobutu's reign, the 
key objective for the leader was to create a unified, Congolese identity that superseded the tribal 
divisions in a country whose borders were drawn by colonial hands. This section can be summed up 
via another difference between identity politics and nation-building: the former mostly deals with 
bottom-up approaches for binding a group of people together, which may be inferred from the 
definition presented above, while nation-building, on the other hand, is more top-down. It is this 
top-down approach, headed by institutions such as the MPR, the Catholic church, and the 
Kimbanguist church, that will be most relevant for this thesis. 
 Cressida Hayes, "Identity Politics", Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, accessed September 30, 2017, https://12
plato.stanford.edu/entries/identity-politics/.
 Howard J. Wiarda, Political Culture, Political Science, and Identity Politics: an Uneasy Alliance (Abingdon: 13
Routledge, 2016), 148.
 Eric Hobsbawm, "Identity Politics and the Left", Barry Amiel and Norman Melburn Trust, accessed October 2, 2017, 14
http://banmarchive.org.uk/articles/1996%20annual%20lecture.htm.
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Incongruity between nationalist discourse and religion 
 The history of global politics informs us that nationalism and religion are very often 
mutually exclusive as determinants for nation-building. This is especially true for nationalist 
dictatorships. One need to only consider, for example, the Soviet Union, where the state conducted 
an organized campaign against all forms of religion with the end goal of establishing what was 
known as state atheism. According to Vladimir Lenin himself, "All modern religions and churches, 
all and of every kind of religious organizations are always considered by Marxism as the organs of 
bourgeois reaction, used for the protection of the exploitation and the stupefaction of the working 
class."  This may be seen as the official party directive, but in between the lines, this campaign 15
against the churches in the Soviet Union was also aimed at eradicating any form of power 
competition vis-à-vis the regime. In Zaire, this was likely no different, as soon enough, Mobutu 
realized the mobilizing potential of the churches, and the danger this could present for the stability 
of his nationalist leadership.  
 Nonetheless, it is also important to consider how nationalism and religion can influence one 
another. According to Riefer, the many renowned authors on the topic of nationalism, some of 
which have been mentioned in this literature review, such as Ernest Gellner, Benedict Anderson, 
and Eric Hobsbawm, have stayed largely silent on the interplay between the two.  Another example 16
of anti-religious zeal in history is Mustafa Kemal Atatürk's campaign in the newly formed state of 
Turkey in the 1920s, where he sought to rid Turkey of all forms of religion, for this would be the 
only way to achieve some sense of modernity. This example hints more at the cultural aspect of 
religion and the influence this bears over society, which already comes closer to the Zairean case. 
Riefer argues that both nationalism and religion can help people to formulate a sense of identity,  17
 Vladimir I. Lenin, Collected Works Volume 17: December 1910-April 1912, trans. Dora Cox, ed. George Hanna 15
(Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1963).
 Barbara-Ann J. Rieffer, "Religion and Nationalism: Understanding the Consequences of a Complex Relationship", 16
Ethnicities 3, no. 2 (2003): 216.
 Ibid., 217-8.17
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and this definitely holds true for Zaire, but what is still missing here is the full encompassment of 
the postcolonial perspective. Most of the academic literature on nationalism (and the influence of 
religion) is modeled on the nation formation process in Europe, which followed a more natural 
pattern throughout history. Elsewhere in the world, with the Congo and Africa in general being 
prominent examples, colonialism wrought havoc upon this natural process, and in a number of 
cases, identity formation had to start completely anew. While in the Congo the Catholic church had 
a lingering influence deriving from the beginning of the 20th century, this is not the case for the 
nationalist program of Authenticité, which will be outlined in greater detail below. 
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Research design 
 Following the review of the academic literature, we have seen that nation-building, state-
building, and identity politics all bear some degree of relevance towards our understanding of 
Mobutu's cultural policy of Authenticité. Next to Authenticité, another important driver of identity 
formation was (and is) the Catholic church, which begs the question: under which banner is the 
population more effectively unified, under a common nationality or a common religion? This points 
us towards the central research question that will be posed in this thesis, namely "What impact did 
Mobutism have on the societal role played by the Catholic church and other religious actors in 
nation-building in Zaire and the Congo?" In order to derive the answer to this, a framework 
consisting of several elements of the existing scholarship on nationalism has been the developed. 
These points of comparison have largely been adapted from the works of Grosby  and Miscevic : 18 19
• How loyalty to the institution in question is fostered, what the nature of the pro-national 
attitude is, and what guardianship of the institution consists of. 
• The nature of belonging to the institution, and what benefits the 'subjects' gain from their 
admission to the institution in question. 
• What behavioral code the institution in question imposes on its 'subjects'. 
While theories of nationalism are, of course, almost exclusively applicable to nations, this paper 
will treat the MPR, the Catholic church, and the Kimbanguist church on an equal footing — all 
three being referred to above as an 'institution'. Furthermore, several sub-questions have been 
formulated, which will help the reader to deal with the subject matter of the individual chapters. The 
answers to these sub-questions can then be bound together so as to provide a more comprehensive 
answer to the central research question. The sub-questions are as follows: 
 Steven Grosby, Nationalism: a Very Short Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005).18
 Nenad Miscevic, "Nationalism", Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, accessed January 24, 2018, https://19
plato.stanford.edu/entries/nationalism/.
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• What were the aims of ideologies and programs such as Mobutism and Authenticité? 
• How did ordinary Zaireans respond to Mobutu's crusade against the Catholic church? 
• What role was played by traditional beliefs, such as Kimbanguism? 
• Can Mobutu be held responsible for the fact that contemporary Congo has not yet 
disintegrated? 
 When it comes to theories of international relations, one theory that is well-suited for the 
case at hand is constructivism. Fierke writes that "Constructivists embrace an intersubjective 
ontology, emphasizing norms, social agents, and structures, and the mutual constitution of identity, 
but accept an epistemology indebted to positivism."  Hence, constructivism will serve as the lens 20
through which the problem at hand — the interaction between Mobutu's policies and the Catholic 
and Kimbanguist churches in Zairean nation-building and identity formation — will be studied. 
This means that the source material that will be used, both primary and secondary, is to be treated in 
such a way that it becomes evident that the setting in which Zaire found itself is the result of 
ongoing social practice and interaction. 
 The current research design is within-case with a historical perspective, but the thesis is not 
bound to one specific methodology. Rather, the choice has been made to gather a wide range of data 
and source material on the topic, and to evaluate each source on its own merit. What can be said in 
favor of this approach is that data collection and interpretation are core tenets of positivism (the 
philosophical system that holds that every rationally justifiable assertion can be scientifically 
proven), and hence stand at the core of the constructivist lens of this paper. The most important 
piece of data under study will be the number of churchgoers in Zaire in the time of Mobutu. With 
accurate statistics on the matter, as well as the number of followers in other religions in the country, 
 Karin M. Fierke, "Constructivism", in International Relations Theory: Discipline and Diversity, eds. Tim Dunne et 20
al. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 193.
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such as Kimbanguism, we will be able to assess the causal extent to which Mobutu's campaign 
against the Catholic church influenced the church's position as unifier in an otherwise divided Zaire.  
 Beyond evaluating religious statistics of the Zairean population under the Mobutu regime, a 
significant portion of this paper will also be devoted to the qualitative study of both primary and 
secondary sources. In doing so, it is important to ensure the diversity in this wealth of sources, as 
Thies warns: "Relying exclusively on autobiographical accounts would bias your interpretation in 
favor of the way the participants viewed the situation. How was the event reported in the 
newspapers, and what other contemporaneous account can you find? By triangulating with different 
sources of evidence to maximize your archival coverage you should be able to reveal inaccuracies 
or biases in the individual sources, and ultimately construct a more accurate representation of 
history."  With this advice in mind, it will be a principal objective of this thesis to also explore if 21
there have been positive accounts of Mobutu's policies amid the vast range of sources that discredit 
the authoritarian regime. 
 Cameron G. Thies, "A Pragmatic Guide to Qualitative Historical Analysis in the Study of International Relations," 21
International Studies Perspectives 3 (2002): 357.
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Building Zaire from the ground up 
 This section of the paper aims to explore the core tenets of Mobutu Sese Seko's political 
thought. After having staged a bloodless coup d'état for the second time in 1965, Mobutu sought to 
unify the citizens of the Congo (henceforth named Zaire) under one flag, thereby facilitating the 
project of nation-building. In a report that explores the system of patrimonialism that characterized 
much of Mobutu's rule, Robinson writes that "in 1965, Mobutu faced the dual challenge of taking 
control of the deeply fractured ex-colony and then organizing political institutions in a way that 
would allow him to keep it. He had a bureaucracy and army of sorts, but could not rely on 
anybody's loyalty. And he was also short of funds; most of the vast mineral wealth of the country 
(cobalt, copper, gold, and diamonds) was still controlled by foreigners."   22
 Robinson also discusses the possible Weberian route Mobutu could have taken towards 
statehood by establishing a monopoly on violence, but one obstacle on this route is that "Mobutu 
would have had to trust that his army would obey him."  The general political framework later 23
known as Mobutism was the ideology that guided Mobutu's Mouvement Populaire de la Révolution 
(MPR), as well as policymaking in Zaire, throughout his reign. The policy of Authenticité, on the 
other hand, was a specific tool of identity formation employed by Mobutu to rid Zaire from Western 
influences and unify Zaireans under their pre-colonial roots. The ideological position of the MPR 
was determined to be a combination of Mobutism and Authenticité, as laid out in the Manifesto of 
N’sele. Effectively, Authenticité can be seen as falling under Mobutism, but for the purposes of this 
paper, the two will be treated in turn. 
 James A. Robinson, Curing the Mal Zaïrois: the Democratic Republic of Congo Edges toward Statehood (London: 22
Legatum Institute, 2013), 5.
 Ibid., 7.23
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Mobutism 
 First and foremost, it should be noted that Mobutu’s coup in 1965 was apolitical in nature, 
meaning that when he took control of the Congo, he did not do so with a carefully crafted political 
roadmap in mind. According to Charlton, this is also a general characteristic shown in more seizures 
of power by military leaders in history, who often cite national reconstruction and the resolving of 
outstanding disputes as the principal reason for their intervention.  Soon enough, however, the 24
military factor was removed from the power equation, as Mobutu sought to garner political 
legitimacy through the establishment of a party led by himself. This would be the Mouvement 
Populaire de la Révolution (MPR), which came into existence in April 1967 through the infamous 
Manifesto of N’sele (infamous, as the manifesto is often compared to other ‘political bibles’ such as 
Mao Zedong’s Little Red Book ). From the outside, and in its initial stages, the MPR had to 25
represent a popular movement — as the name suggests — but effectively, Mobutu’s power was 
hereby firmly entrenched in the constitutional sense of the word. This was only part of the program 
to turn Zaire into a single-party state, and thus a core element of Mobutism.  
 He came ever closer to achieving his goal of unifying party, people, and state, as he once 
told parliament that "The Congolese people and I are one and the same.”  He also showed that he 26
wanted to make haste with this goal as he outlawed the existence of other political parties and the 
near-to enforcement of membership to the party on the population, declaring that all citizens had to 
become members of the MPR at birth. Through an amendment introduced in 1970, the MPR was 
declared the supreme institution of the state. In other words, the state Zaire became an organ of the 
MPR.  A manner in which Mobutu further expanded his grip over the country was through a 27
 Mark W. Charlton, "Mobutism: the Politics of Authenticity in Zaire" (master's thesis, University of Western Ontario, 24
1976), 65.
 Van Reybrouck, Congo, 342.25
 Ibid.26
 Shawn H. McCormick, "Zaire II: Mobutu, Master of the Game?", Current History 93, no. 583 (May 1994): 224.27
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massive centralization process, as described by Hesselbein: "The number of provinces was 
gradually reduced from twenty-one to eight (plus Kinshasa), and their previous financial autonomy 
was re-centralized through the presidency, which proved to be more efficient at allocating resources 
than the previously autonomous provincial authorities. … State representatives were shifted around 
the country every three years and normally could not serve in their home area."  According to 28
Kazadi, Mobutism was one of the factors that led to the development of a cult of personality around 
Mobutu, as the system which the dictator himself created allowed him to move freely in that same 
system and take on more responsibility and status as the years went by. "First billed as the savior of 
the country, Mobutu became the "father of the revolution." A few years later, he became the "guide" 
who was "married" to his people through an eternal contract."  29
 In broad strokes, the ideology of Mobutism, with Authenticité at its core, is a means of mass 
mobilization, an act that can be achieved by "bringing under control those peripheral areas of the 
political system that have previously been outside the reach of the central authority."  A key step in 30
realizing this mass mobilization, and thereby also a central element in Mobutism, is the distance 
from the game of politics that the leader imposes upon him or herself. Criticizing the leaders that 
preceded him and declaring himself to be the only solution to the political infighting and corruption 
that marked the period from 1960 to 1965, Mobutu saw that asserting the apolitical nature of both 
his leadership and the MPR as party were important measures to take. His rising above the political 
struggles of the past immensely assisted in shaping his personal image of unifier and nation-
builder.  In the early years of his rule, the existence of Mobutism was marked by actions that 31
served to enhance Zaire's national prestige. This was, then, often used as a justification of unpopular 
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policy, an example here being the currency devaluation of 1967. Furthermore, the text of Mobutu's 
first speech before the United Nations General Assembly was turned into mandatory study material; 
with the content of the speech itself Mobutu raised himself to the level of principal spokesperson for 
Africa in the forum for global affairs, as well as principal ally of the Arab countries in their struggle 
against Israel.  32
 On a local, regional level, the MPR was running like a well-oiled machine and used 
coercion as a tool to bring different strata of the population together. Charlton, for instance, writes 
of mandatory attendance at party rallies and parades, which was checked by party officials. "When 
the actual event takes place, all of the bars, shops and offices are closed and the business and social 
life of the community grinds to a halt. If the town is big enough, buses and trucks are 
commandeered by the party in order to transport as many of the rally as possible."  The essence of 33
mobilizing the population in order to achieve prosperity seems to have been a remnant of Mobutu's 
state visits to China. In 1973 and 1974, he visited China and each time was amazed at the country's 
economic self-sufficiency and mobilizing capacities of the population. Therefore, China had to 
serve as an example for Zaire in years to come. 
Authenticité 
  The ideological path the Mobutu government undertook towards creating a unified nation-
state is not seen by scholars as a healthy one. Young and Turner even go so far as to call the policy 
of authenticity and the overarching framework of Mobutism a "modernized version of Leopoldian 
absolutism."  For Mobutu, Authenticité represented a return to the Congo's ancestral roots, but in 34
such a way that it would not block the country's road to modernity. In his words, it would be a 
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recours à l'authenticité as opposed to a retour à l'authenticité.  It has been variously described by 35
the leader as "'the motor in the construction of the nation', 'the cement which holds the entire 
structure together', and the device to 'stop the mental alienation brought by the colonial 
experience.'"  As a unifying force, Authenticité only began to take root in the early 1970s. "In 36
1974, the party institutionalized Mobutism with the following pronouncement: "Authenticity is the 
ideology; authentic Zairian nationalism is the doctrine; and the return to authenticity is the method. 
Together the three stages represent Mobutism, the thought and reason of Mobutu.""  Thus linked 37
together in an intricate manner, it would become evident that the revamping of a Zairean identity 
would take place across different levels of society. At the nationwide level, the rebranding of 
country from 'Congo' to 'Zaire' obviously jumps to mind — a policy accompanied by the adoption 
of the MPR emblem as the flag of the new country. At the same time, it was declared that the 
famous river found in Joseph Conrad's Heart of Darkness, as well as the national currency would 
also carry the name 'Zaire'.  
 Similar to other countries that have attempted to reinvent themselves throughout history, 
Mobutu also instituted a dress code reform, a practice that affected the Zairean people directly (in 
their wardrobes). Women were henceforth only allowed to wear the pagne (a multicolored long 
cloth) whereas men had to drop the European suit in favor of the Maoist-inspired abacost. 
Furthermore, the French terms of formal address, Monsieur and Madame, were forcibly traded in 
for the terms Citoyen and Citoyenne, which carried with it a revolutionary connotation. Ironically, 
however, the dress code and address reforms had the unwanted side effect of making a statement 
about class. The label of Citoyen was often reserved for foreign minorities, while the ordinary 
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Zaireans often could not afford the abacost,  thereby making these forms of authenticity 38
inaccessible to the lower classes. 
 In the same vein as renaming the country, personal names as well as other prominent 
geographical names were also changed. Examples include the change from the capital Léopoldville 
to Kinshasa and Stanleyville into Kisangani; Mobutu himself discarded his Christian first name of 
Joseph-Désiré in lieu of the more authentic name Mobutu Sese Seko Kuku Ngbendu Wa Za Banga. 
According to Dunn, "It would be a mistake to assume that this act of (re)naming was an attempt to 
bring the past back to life. Rather, it was transformative in that it sought to create new knowledge 
formations: 'the naming, the representing, and the claiming are all one; the naming brings the reality 
of order into being.'"  Rather than speaking of a recours or a retour à l'authenticité, Lagae and De 39
Raedt argue that the policy can better be seen in Hobsbawmian terms as the 'invention of tradition', 
which is best showcased in the funding and subsidies given to selected art schools and artists, for 
example, who were tasked with defining "a new artistic language rooted in the local tradition."   40
 In the same article, the two authors show that architectural designs from the early Mobutu 
years can also be seen as a manifestation of Authenticité. An architect named Eugène Palumbo, who 
made many designs for buildings in Kinshasa said himself that the mural decorations found on, for 
instance, the Tribunal de 1ère instance or the Church of Très Saint Sacrément are signs of 
authenticity in Kinshasa's architectural landscape, but that this nonetheless should not be confused 
with the rise of a genuine Zairean style of architecture. Many more designs created by Palumbo and 
others never came into fruition due to the economic crisis Zaire tumbled into starting in the 1970s. 
"Until this day, the urban landscape of Kinshasa … thus remains largely defined by edifices dating 
from the colonial era, testifying to the fact that the legacy of Mobutu's policy of recours à 
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l'authenticité remains, above all, embedded in words, music, and ephemeral images rather than 
being imprinted in stone."   41
 Another way in which the landscape of cities like Kinshasa changed was the tearing down of 
statues remnant of the past, such as those of Henry Morton Stanley and King Léopold II. Adelman 
says that "authenticity ought to be evaluated by its results rather than by the depth of its 
metaphysics",  and the tearing down of these statues seems to be an appropriate example in this 42
regard. However, Sakombi Inongo, one of the chief ideologues of the Mobutu regime, said that he 
did not "consider authenticity 'as a reaction, against the old colonizers and even less a vengeance, 
but as a positive affirmation of ourselves. If we take down the statue of Léopold II, this is not to 
denigrate his memory but because the principle monument of a capital cannot be consecrated to the 
glory of a foreigner.'"  This seems to show that Authenticité in Zaire can equally be seen as both a 43
physical and a mental process with many facets. The successes of these projects in unifying a 
divided nation is to be evaluated in the following two chapters.  
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Religion as a unifying force in Mobutu's Zaire 
 The links between religion and state formation in Zaire are extensive, to say the least. 
Religion has been an important force in both cultural and political affairs during the time of 
Mobutu, and still continues to embody this significant role in contemporary Zaire. One needs to 
only refer to the statistics to see this. Kaputu writes that "In the contemporary era, the majority of 
the residents are Christian — 50 percent are Roman Catholic and 20 percent are Protestant — while 
10 percent are Muslim and another 10 percent are Kimbanguist, with the remaining 10 percent 
belonging to other syncretic and indigenous faiths."  Christianity was, of course, by and large a 44
byproduct of colonization. The Belgian missionaries that traveled to the area known as the Belgian 
Congo over the course of the 19th and the early 20th century spread Roman Catholicism and 
Protestantism in the areas they visited, for they reasoned that the traditional religious practices 
which they encountered were "uncivilized, primitive, and unworthy."  From Belgium's perspective, 45
it was the church's task to assist in completing the infamous 'civilizing mission' that sought to create 
"a healthy, literate, and disciplined workforce, one that was obedient to the governing authorities. 
From the perspective of the church, evangelization was the primary goal, and the number of 
converts baptized was the measure of its success."   46
 Over time, rituals borrowed from shamanism and black magic have started to become 
intermingled with the Roman Catholic and Protestant influences, but the latter two are still 
distinguishable as two remarkable variables in the equation of Zairean nation-building under the 
reign of Mobutu Sese Seko. It is important to note the difference between colonial times and the 
Mobutu era in this regard, as during the time of colonialism "church and state goals were 
sufficiently complementary that the state and the church were perceived by the population as 
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sharing the same purpose."  During the time of Mobutu, however, this changed as Mobutu saw the 47
church as a threat to the authority he could exercise over the state. Despite Mobutu's (ironical) 
'crusade' against the Catholic church, it would still remain on the political and cultural scene as a 
force to be reckoned with. With that in mind, this section of the paper is devoted to analyzing the 
role of the Catholic church in Zairean nation-building from 1965 onwards, whereafter attention will 
also be devoted to the lingering influence of traditional beliefs, of which Kimbanguism was (and is) 
the most pertinent. Last of all, the paper will study the way in which Mobutu attempted to turn his 
ideology of Mobutism into a replacement for religion and promoted himself as being at the helm of 
this 'invented' church. 
Influence of the Catholic church 
 In order to evaluate the role that the Catholic church had in the nation-building process in 
Zaire, this paper will evaluate this actor along three variables: the nature of loyalty, the meaning of 
'belonging', and the behavioral code imposed on followers. As described before, the Catholic church 
became prevalent in the Congo when it was governed by the Belgian colonial administration, which 
fervently employed Catholicism as a tool to take Congo out of its 'backwardness'. According to 
Sundkler and Steed, this led to a situation where the Catholic church became closely intertwined 
with the habits and day-to-day life of the Congolese, rather than remaining a force that simply 
'hovers' above the population. This is shown in the fact that Belgian missions active in the Congo 
educated local Congolese in the ways of the Catholic church: "In 1946 the first three African priests 
of Kinshasa were ordained, among them the future Cardinal Malula and the future assistant bishop 
of Kinshasa, Mgr Moke. The emerging class of évolués were closely related to the Catholic 
church."  By évolué, the authors mean to denote the section of Congolese society that, during 48
 Ibid.47
 Bengt Sundkler and Christopher Steed, A History of the Church in Africa (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 48
2004), 764.
!22
colonial times, was attaining to a higher standard of living, mostly expressed through customs and 
culture. Hence, the Catholic church came to be associated with the upper strata of society. Over 
time, the number of Catholics in the Belgian Congo increased significantly. In 1920, the country 
had 655,000 Catholics in a population of 10 million, whereas by 1960, the year of independence, 
this had increased to 5.7 million followers in a population of 15.2 million, well over one-third.  49
Even when Congo became independent and when its name changed into Zaire, the Catholic church 
remained popular, with the statistics showing that between 35 percent and 45 percent of the Zairean 
population subscribed to being Roman Catholic. This general growth trend continued across the 
African continent as a whole in the post-independence era.  50
 When Mobutu ascended to power, the struggle between church and state would pan out to 
be more of a personal duel between between the dictator himself and the Belgian-trained cardinal 
Joseph Malula, who was appointed as archbishop of Kinshasa in July 1964. Despite both being self-
declared "protagonists of 'Africanization' to replace the traumatic experience of colonial rule" , 51
Mobutu increasingly began to use the Catholic church as a scapegoat for Zaire's economic and 
political problems. In particular, he was annoyed at "the 'foreignness' of the Catholic church, its 
links with Rome and the West, while in his eyes Protestants and Kimbanguists were above such 
suspicion, as they appeared not to take orders from abroad."  This prompted several moves that 52
would serve to limit the power of the Catholic church in Zaire, which will be outlined in greater 
detail further on. In the early years of Mobutu's rule, the relationship can be characterized as 
cordial, especially from the perspective of the Catholic church. In 1965, Malula issued a declaration 
that addressed Mobutu personally, in which he stated that "'the Church recognizes your authority, 
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because authority comes from God. We will loyally apply the laws you establish. You can count on 
us in your work of restoring the peace toward which all so ardently aspire.'"  53
 In terms of answering the nation-building questions of this thesis, it can be said that the 
Catholic church in Zaire had a strong leadership in the form of Malula. Boyle writes that in 1961, a 
Zairean priest took control of the Church's large school system,  which shows that the nature of 54
belonging to the Church for Zairean people was involuntary in such a way that it was homegrown 
through the educational system, which even progressed up to the tertiary level with the University 
of Lovanium, a university with a Catholic outlook, and one of the few universities in the country. 
Furthermore, "the independence generation counted on the institutional strengths of a slowly 
Africanizing church to assist in reestablishing social stability. … The belief among Zairean 
Catholics that working for the church was contributing to national development gave energy to the 
effort."  This is proof of the fact that the role of the Catholic church in Zairean nation-building was 55
very much taken for granted, and that the Zairean people at the grassroots level wished to contribute 
to the work of the church, which indirectly is a method to foster loyalty, as well. It was exactly this 
foreign support that annoyed Mobutu, from which the church generated a lot of its power. 
According to Young and Turner,  
 the hierarchy and worldwide structure of the church provided an institutional infrastructure  
 of resiliency and solidity. … Until the 1950s the church provided to Zairians the only avenue 
 of social promotion where full equality with Europeans could be obtained, and the   
 priesthood attracted some of the most gifted young men of the pre-independence    
 generations. … As a result of these conditions the church was much more than a community  
 of believers; it was an organization of national scope, whose penetration of the interior was  
 comparable in scale to that of the state, and whose social service structures were generally  
 far more effective."   56
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In areas such as healthcare and education, the statistics speak in favor of the Catholic church: "In 
1974 Catholic schools enrolled 61.7 percent of Zaire's primary pupils and 42.1 percent of its 
secondary students, as compared to 13.8 percent and 35.4 percent in the state schools. … official 
estimates in 1972 conceded that 75 percent of the meager health services available to rural 
populations came through the churches."  These numbers give the Catholic church a solid 57
foundation to stand on, and facilitate the mission of uniting many Zaireans, regardless of their tribal 
heritage, under the banner of Roman Catholicism in Zaire. That the Catholic church so significantly 
outperformed the government in 1974, nine years after Mobutu's ascendancy, and several years after 
the start of the Authenticité campaign, only further supports this argument. Although he originally 
endorsed Mobutu in public, Cardinal Malula would later speak on behalf of many concerned 
Zaireans, Roman Catholic in nature but also extending beyond this category. He did so at the tenth 
anniversary of Zaire's independence, in the presence of both Mobutu and the Belgian King 
Baudouin. "He regretted the inequities of resource distribution, and denounced political elites for "a 
fascination with the triumphant and the superficial, and a hunger for the lavish. To Mobutu this was 
an unforgiveable [sic] act of lèse-majesté, though he did not respond immediately."  The response 58
may indeed not have been immediate, but Mobutu did take care to limit the power and efficacy of 
the Catholic church as much as he could. 
Bringing the MPR into the mix: a valid replacement for religious beliefs? 
 In studying the role of the Mouvement Populaire de la Révolution, and in answering the 
nation-building-related subquestions associated with the MPR's activities, we can again focus on 
education and the role of the youth. Instrumental in the MPR's desire to prepare the nation's youth 
to take the reins in a future Second Republic where Mobutism was still alive and kicking, was the 
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Jeunesse du Mouvement Populaire de la Révolution (JMPR), the MPR's youth wing. According to 
Schatzberg, "in March 1975 the pivotal role of Zairian youth was underscored when a special 
session of the party's ideological institute was held for JMPR leaders from all parts of the country. 
At that gathering, the State Commissioner for Political Affairs characterized 'the school, by the fact 
that it diffuses a common system of ideas, feelings, habits, and beliefs … as the integrative milieu 
par excellence' [emphasis in the original]."  The establishment of the JMPR was an initiative from 59
the upper echelons of the MPR, and was in no way actually a desire from students in Zaire for an 
organization that would represent their interests. Hence, the creation of this organization can be 
seen as a classic example of top-down nation-building as opposed to bottom-up.  
 The JMPR can be ascribed with partial success in its mission of inculcating the Zairean 
student body with the core tenets of Mobutism. Schatzberg argues that this is because of the general 
vagueness surrounding some of the core concepts that are central to Mobutism, such as the words 
authenticité, radicalisation, and révolution. Authenticité had been successful in the sense that it was 
commonly observed throughout the 1970s that the Zairean people (including the Zairean youth) 
now reflect on their heritage with pride. It "has been grasped not only by the political leadership … 
but by many ordinary folk as well. The idea of an authentic way of doing things, of a recourse to 
ancestral customs, as well as the concomitant pride in these traditions is one of the striking 
achievements of the Mobutu regime and should not be minimized."  The meaning of the terms 60
radicalisation and révolution — terms that appeared often in political speeches at the time — on the 
other hand, was poorly understood. Furthermore, the leadership of the MPR placed a lot of 
emphasis on preparing students for their future lives dwelling in rural areas, "since that is where 
many of them come from and where the vast majority of the population as a whole still lives. In the 
schools, as in other domains, until July 1975 this ideological impulse was translated into a program 
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of unpaid communal agricultural work called Salongo, generally on one afternoon a week."  The 61
advent of Salongo is interesting, as this could suggest that the MPR was attempting to 
counterbalance the influence of the Catholic church in rural areas, but failed in that regard because 
Salongo, seen here as service for the regime was not as popular as service for the Catholic church.  
 Thus, in short, the case study of the JMPR shows that, using our framework of nation-
building, loyalty to the ideals of Mobutism was principally fostered through the educational system, 
and membership here was involuntary since all Zaireans automatically became members of the 
MPR at birth, and the younger generation would automatically become acquainted with the JMPR 
in the public school system. This school system would then also instruct them with a behavioral 
code, helping them to differentiate between right and wrong. Strikingly, however, attending public 
school seemingly was not compulsory, given the low rate of enrollment referred to earlier in this 
thesis. Therefore, it was key for the Mobutu regime to extend its grip over the educational system as 
much as possible. The most prominent example of this is the transformation of the Catholic 
University of Lovanium into the secular Université Nationale du Zaire in August 1971. On top of 
that, Mobutu ordered in December 1971 that JMPR branches had to be established in all seminaries 
across the country, thereby using the JMPR as a tool to win terrain at the expense of the Catholic 
church.  62
 The role that Mobutu attributed to himself in the nation-building process also merits special 
attention. At times, Mobutu did not per see seek to compete with the Catholic church for influence, 
but rather he sought to completely eclipse and replace the Catholic church, as evidenced by this 
historical piece from TIME Magazine: "In building his new cult, Mobutu has gone so far as to ban 
Christmas as a national holiday. Some followers even printed hymns in newspapers that substituted 
Mobutu's name for that of Jesus Christ. In December the state press agency announced that the 
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nation's single political party "must henceforth be considered as a church, and its founder a 
messiah."  Further evidence for this is presented in a state radio broadcast from 1972, which told 63
listeners that ""the party [MPR] and not religion should inspire the people" and that the people 
should believe in the MPR and not the Catholic church."  In research done by Schatzberg among 64
bureaucrats in Zaire, asking them what characteristics a leader should possess, it was concluded that 
"paternal authority is an idealized model for exemplary bureaucratic behavior in Zaire. A father is a 
teacher — he instructs; he is a repository of moral virtue — he is sociable, listens to opinions, and 
cares for those under his control…"  While this description is not entirely applicable to Mobutu 65
and the leadership of the MPR, his personal association with a Messianic figure undoubtedly 
assisted him in gaining national recognition as the man to take Zaire forward, making it seemingly 
impossible for him to do wrong. 
Kimbanguism: the dark horse? 
 Another religious movement that should be studied here is Kimbanguism, or the Église de 
Jésus Christ sur la Terre par le Prophète Simon Kimbangu (Church of Jesus Christ on Earth 
through the Prophet Simon Kimbangu). This movement traces its roots to the colonial era, having 
been founded in 1921 by catechist Simon Kimbangu, and remains popular to this day, with 
approximately 10 percent of the contemporary Congolese population declaring itself to be professed 
believers of this strand of Christianity.  In characterizing Kimbanguism as a religion and its place 66
on the Congolese/Zairean religious plane, Van Reybrouck describes it at "an African form of 
imported faith", since it sought to distance itself from precolonial religious customs and practices 
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related to witchcraft but still advocated traditional healing methods for the sick. Furthermore, 
Simon Kimbangu himself was not per se known for spreading anti-colonial rhetoric, but the 
colonial authorities still sought to halt the growth of the Kimbanguist church at every turn.  By the 67
time Mobutu was in charge, however, the tables were turned, as here the Kimbanguist church would 
enjoy a relative degree of freedom, and was one of the few religious denominations that were 
officially recognized by the MPR, next to Catholicism and Protestantism. The fact that 
Kimbanguism was 'homegrown', as opposed to the Catholic church with its foreign roots that 
Mobutu so detested, is a probable explanation for the fact that it was not antagonized as much 
during the dictator's reign. On the contrary, the leadership of the Kimbanguist church was actually 
on good terms with Mobutu, as the latter visited several Kimbanguist schools and social centers 
during the height of tensions with the Catholic church in 1975, in order to show how pleased he was 
with the cooperation between the regime and the movement.  Among the Zairean people living 68
under the Mobutu regime, the Kimbanguist church was also popular because "Social services 
offered through church channels, in the education and health fields, have retained their quality, in 
contrast to those of the state. Kimbanguist, Protestant, and Catholic churches have remained free of 
the taint of corruption which affected the state. While the churches have not been channels to power 
and influence, they have offered status and security."  This does not necessarily set the 69
Kimbanguist church apart from the Catholic church, but the fact that the former was condoned by 
the MPR definitely assisted it in flourishing; it would therefore be appropriate to call the 
Kimbanguist church a dark horse. 
 From a nation-building perspective, Kimbanguism is one of the few denominations to cause 
a certain sense of divisiveness in Zaire, and this can be traced back to its linguistic foundations. 
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MacGaffey has undertaken a study of the Kimbanguist church in the city of Kisangani in the 1980s, 
and found that  
 The Church in Kisangani speaks Lingala, which began to be widely spoken in the city only  
 during the 1950s. It is the language of those who work in inferior capacities for the   
 government; it is the language of commerce in Kinshasa, and of those who come from the  
 west and are regarded as foreigners by the local population (Lokele and others), whose own  
 lingua franca is Swahili. The Lokele, within the Church as in the city at large, resent what  
 they see as foreign control of 'their city', and this resentment is linked to the specifically   
 political appeal of Kimbanguism in the post-war period.  70
Furthermore, MacGaffey also concludes that "Discussion of ethnic rivalries during and after the 
foundation of the Church is related to the content of oral traditions, which represent several political 
tendencies."  Therefore, for the purposes of this paper, it can be concluded that for the nation-71
building project, Kimbanguism by far did not reach the same political appeal as did the Catholic 
church and the MPR, albeit the latter one can be characterized as an imposed top-down approach.  
 The Kimbanguist church gives off the impression of being a well-organized movement, as 
under the 'patronage' of Mobutu's regime, they installed a specialized secretariat and a ruling 
council of thirty-two pastors, all of whom were chosen by the Supreme Head of the church, who by 
this time was Simon Kimbangu's son, Diangienda.  While the aforementioned linguistic issue 72
might cause a different result in practice, it should be noted that the Kimbanguist church does not 
focus on one language group in particular. Materials to spread public awareness of the movement, 
for instance, are widely disseminated in various language. Furthermore, radio broadcasts focus on 
the African character of the church, in the hopes of attracting followers through the movement's 
Congolese background. It is said that the leader of the church is revered like a king and is the 
absolute ruler over all followers, in a strange parallel to the way Mobutu was the absolute ruler (or 
'messiah') of Zaire. If, for the purposes of this paper, we hold the Catholic church, the MPR, and the 
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Kimbanguist church as components that each contribute to the Zairean nation-building process, then 
this calls into question whether the element of a strong leadership is essential in each of these 
different components. The Kimbanguist church also imposes upon its followers a strict code of 
conduct: "Members must not engage in polygamy. Members of the Kimbanguist church must not 
use tobacco, hemp, and they must abstain from alcoholic drinks. They must not eat pork or monkey. 
Members are also urged to pay taxes promptly, and respect must be shown to those in authority. 
Love is preached quite often, and members are urged to love all, irrespective of race or color."  73
Again, the element of authority returns in this passage on code of conduct, from which we may 
deduct that leadership is essential to the church's survival as an influence on Zairean nation-
building. 
 Deji Ayegboyin and S. Ademola Ishola, "African Indigenous Churches — Chapter Fifteen: the Kimbanguist Church", 73
Institute for Religious Research, accessed February 6, 2018, http://irr.org/african-indigenous-churches-chapter-fifteen.
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The post-Mobutu era: reflections on contemporary Congo 
 When Mobutu Sese Seko was finally deposed in 1997, after a reign that lasted thirty-two 
years, he left Zaire ravaged and penniless. After all, in the history books, Mobutu's totalitarian 
dictatorship is now described as the archetypal regime in areas such as clientelism, cronyism, 
corruption, nepotism, and embezzlement of state funds. However, to say that the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo, the name the country reassumed after Mobutu's departure, is now better off, 
would also be a false assumption. In 1997, Mobutu's regime was toppled by Laurent-Désiré Kabila 
from the Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo-Zaire (AFDL; or 
Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire in English), and after being 
assassinated by one of his bodyguards in 2001, Kabila senior was succeeded as president by his son, 
Joseph Kabila. Both Kabilas had a stake in the Second Congo War, which raged in the east of the 
country until 2003, but the flickering embers of the conflict are still felt in the region ever since. 
The conflict was largely a byproduct of the Kabila's victory march towards Kinshasa, as it started in 
the east of the country, and received considerable support from troops hailing from Rwanda, 
Uganda, and Burundi.   
 In discussing the conflicts that still endanger peace and stability in the DRC today, two 
conflicts in particular merit our attention, namely the Ituri conflict and the Kivu conflict, both of 
which take place in the east of the country. Both conflicts were sparked in the aftermath of the 
Second Congo War, and it is the Kivu conflict that will be discussed in more detail below. One of 
the principal victims of the Second Congo War and the Kivu conflict were (and still are) the 
Banyamulenge people living in the general Kivu area. While being Congolese, these people had 
Tutsi origins, the ethnic group that Kabila had ordered his soldiers from the AFDL to fight against. 
The hostile attitude against the Banyamulenge thus serves as a telltale to evaluate the successes and 
— in this case specifically — the failures of the Zairean/Congolese nation-building endeavor. In the 
end, despite the low-level ethnic conflicts that still plague the Congo, the sense of national 
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solidarity has not completely evaporated. To that end, this section of the thesis will investigate why 
that is the case and what is left of the sense of 'Zaireanness' that Mobutu has aimed to instill the 
population with through Mobutism and Authenticité. Lastly, this section will also analyze what 
influence the Catholic church and other religious actors still have on the nation-building process in 
contemporary Congo. 
Ethnic strife in the east 
 Over the course of his reign, Mobutu was already forced to deal with influxes of refugees 
coming in from Rwanda and Burundi. As a result of this, a Kinyarwanda-speaking minority began 
to form in the east, and they were not exactly welcomed by the local population. Mobutu sought to 
resolve these tensions by issuing the Citizenship Decree in 1972, by which refugees that had entered 
Zaire from Rwanda in the period between 1959 and 1963 were given Zairean citizenship. With the 
General Property Law introduced in 1973, which catered for the nationalization of all land and its 
redistribution among certain Zairean citizens, "the more prosperous among the Kinyarwanda-
speaking population cashed in on their newly acquired citizenship to gain property rights. … To 
many in Kivu Province, the 1972 Citizenship Decree came to symbolize not simply an inclusive 
citizenship policy but one so undiscriminating that, if followed in practice, it would surely turn 
Kivu into an open sanctuary for the surplus population from Rwanda and Burundi."  As Mobutu's 74
chief of staff at the time was an ethnic Tutsi, the 'authentic' Zaireans of the Kivu region saw these 
two policies as a direct result of the Tutsis' growing influence in the state apparatus. Thus, in this 
instance we can observe the birth of schisms in the Kivu region, but one can also see that Mobutu 
undertook deliberate policy moves to sweep these tensions under the rug, so that they would not 
endanger the greater nation-building project.  
 Mahmood Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism, and the Genocide in Rwanda (Princeton, 74
NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001), 244.
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 According to Dunn, ethnic tensions in the Congo were first visibly exposed after Mobutu 
called for a Sovereign National Conference to be held in 1991 in order to discuss a more democratic 
future for Zaire, as it was then still known.  
 Representatives from the North and South Kivu provinces in the eastern part of the country  
 used the national conference as a forum to attack the Kinyarwanda speakers in the regions,  
 referred to as Banyarwanda and Banyamulenge, respectively. The Kivu representatives   
 sought to rescind the citizenship of these groups under the 1981 Zairian Nationality Act and  
 force them to return to Rwanda and Burundi. This highlighted ongoing and complex   
 tensions in the Great Lakes region, most of which related to issues of identity and access to  
 land.  75
Soon enough, this turned out to be the trigger for the start of attacks and long periods of ethnic 
violence. It was at this very Sovereign National Conference that the first phases of unraveling of 
Mobutism were seen — phases in which Mobutu even played a role himself: "By first favoring the 
Tutsi community, and more specifically the first generation of 'fifty-niners' [Tutsi migrants that 
settled in Kivu in 1959], against 'native Congolese', and then turning against them, and by declaring 
all Banyarwanda foreigners and denying them rights of citizenship, Mobutu sowed the seeds of his 
own undoing."  76
 During his time in power, Laurent-Désiré Kabila did not exactly portray himself as a 
'president of the people'. Here, the parallel with Mobutu is drawn in the sense that "both accessed 
power with the help of the West, but against the will of the many people. A popular saying is that 
there is 'Mobutism without Mobutu' in the country nowadays."  Indeed, he would rely a lot on 77
support from abroad rather than attempting to gain domestic support. The only rhetoric device he 
employed to take a shot at winning this domestic support was to publicly declare himself the 
liberator of the Congo. Furthermore, he added gasoline to the fire of linguistic issues still present in 
 Kevin C. Dunn, "A Survival Guide to Kinshasa: Lessons of the Father, Passed Down to the Son", in The African 75
Stakes of the Congo War, ed. John F. Clark (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), 55.
 René Lemarchand, The Dynamics of Violence in Central Africa (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 76
2009), 228.
 Meike J. de Goede, "'Mundele, It Is Because of You' — History, Identity and the Meaning of Democracy in the 77
Congo", The Journal of Modern African Studies 53, no. 4 (2015): 601.
!34
the Congo by calling Lingala (the language spoken in Kinshasa) a dirty language, and preferring to 
deliver his political speeches in Swahili with an interpreter by his side.  With his alienation of the 78
Tutsi living in the east, Kabila's conception of the Congolese identity "shifted away from a 
pluralistic, anti-Mobutu foundation to one of shared ethnic hostilities."  Perhaps the epitome of this 79
was the "wanton killing of hundreds of Banyamulenge in Kinshasa and Lubumbashi in the wake of 
the 1998 war when the Kabila government declared open season on them."  In this instance, the 80
Banyamulenge were framed by the state media as forming a Hamitic threat to the Bantu people, in 
reference to their ancestral origins. On top of that, the Kabila government never forgave the 
Banyamulenge for turning Kivu into a colony of neighboring Rwanda.   81
 It must be said, however, that around the end of the 1990s, the Banyamulenge community 
broke off its ties with the Rwandan government, as it felt it had been used by the regime during the 
Second Congo War, and refused to accede to the government's call to return en masse to Rwanda.  82
Again, this could be seen as an action on behalf of the Banyamulenge community where they 
consciously choose to put their Congolese identity over their Rwandan heritage, despite the fact that 
this was driven by occurrences on the battlefield. 'Native' Congolese, however, are to this day still 
convinced that if given the choice, the Tutsi Congolese would side with Rwanda.  83
The Catholic church and other religious actors: salvagers of the nationalist ideal? 
 The facts above paint the picture of a nation in distress and despair. Despite the continuous 
ethnic strife, the glue that holds the Democratic Republic of the Congo together is still strong — 
 Clark, African Stakes, 60-1.78
 Ibid., 67.79
 Lemarchand, Dynamics of Violence, 237.80
 Ibid.81
 Ibid., 252.82
 René Lemarchand, "Reflections on the Crisis in Eastern Congo", The Brown Journal of World Affairs 16, no. 1 (Fall/83
Winter 2009): 123.
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what is the reason for this, and have the religious actors played a significant role in preserving it, if 
at all? Geopolitical intelligence platform Stratfor provides a bird's-eye view of the contemporary 
security situation: 
 The president [Kabila junior] no doubt realizes that political security is physical security,   
 and that staying in office increases the safety of himself and those around him from reprisal.  
 With such a weak hand, the president has worked tirelessly to maintain a balance among the  
 divergent interest groups that put his father in power and that undergird his own political   
 standing. Kabila has worked to integrate militant outfits and other rebel groups into the   
 Congolese army, but it has proved a challenging endeavor: several factions have quit the   
 arrangement, only to rejoin when their rebellions fail. The president has responded by   
 shuffling commanders around the country to prevent any single faction from using the   
 military to strengthen itself. The precarious arrangement has left Kabila with a loose grip on  
 the military, and few means of maintaining the fragile political balance of his inherently   
 unstable country.  84
Thus we see a clear link between nation-building and security, two areas that were kept relatively 
separate during Mobutu's time in power, but now that rulership over the country and its precious 
resources has become somewhat of a free-for-all, the two are becoming more and more intertwined. 
According to Court, the current status of ethnic minorities such as the Banyamulenge in the east of 
the DRC can be traced back to Mobutu's political agenda: "the nationalist doctrine that emerged on 
the eve of decolonization, although ostensibly aimed at introducing universal citizenship, instead 
propagated ethnic or regional nationalism and irredentism. As the ideal of citizenship receded and 
as ethno-nationalism took hold, the notion of 'indigeneity' became the touchstone of 'political 
belonging'. … Rather than resolving this tension, Mobutu's autocratic rule merely suppressed it."  85
 Looking at the role of the Catholic church, we can see that the relationship between Mobutu 
and this institution had swayed throughout the 1980s. The dictator managed to win some church 
officials over with his infamous bribes, but in the 1990s, the church would, in unison, support the 
democratization effort in Zaire. The 1990s marked the beginning of a new era in some ways, as 
 "Why the Congo is So Unstable", Stratfor, accessed March 20, 2018, https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/why-84
congo-so-unstable.
 Anthony Court, "The Banyamulenge of South Kivu: the 'Nationality Question'", African Studies 72, no. 3 (2013): 85
434.
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Mobutu proclaimed the end of the Second Republic and the beginning of the Third Republic. He 
was attempting to spin the Kivu conflict in such a way that it would mean his re-entry into the 
international community as a dignified statesman, but the inhabitants of both North and South Kivu 
were suffering.  
 This is where the church again assumed the role it had taken on for much of the Second 
Republic. It gave employment, provided technical services, including radio communications and 
mechanical equipment, press outlets, health services, and education, as the takeover of universities 
by the state in 1971 had led to disastrous results.  Since the Kivu conflict is one with many 86
different groups involved, all of whom represent a multitude of interests and who will stop at 
nothing to achieve these, the Catholic church turned out to be somewhat of a moral beacon. As 
Prunier writes: "Since practically everybody acted in bad faith, everybody turned to the Church to 
provide the moral guidance that was so sorely lacking. But the Church could not respond as a 
homogenous body because the bishops themselves embodied the ethnic and political divisions of 
the conflict."  After all, the clergy active in these two areas are also victims of the armies and 87
militias roaming the Kivu region, simply based off of their ethnicity. Nonetheless, when we observe 
the Church's role as an impartial arbiter and look at the services it has provided, attempting to mend 
the wounds of the long-lasting civil war, one could argue that it still plays its part in the nation-
building process. From the perspective of the Church, ethnicity is irrelevant, but it is exactly this 
ethnic question that still stands at the core of the hostilities, and thereby severely hampers the road 
to unity. 
 Internationally proposed solutions for the DRC's problems have included a move towards 
Balkanization, whereby the country would be split up in different smaller territories in an attempt to 
resolve ethnic and politico-military issues. Within the DRC, however, there has been a lot of 
 Gérard Prunier, "The Catholic Church and the Kivu Conflict", Journal of Religion in Africa 31, no. 2 (2001): 156.86
 Ibid., 157.87
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opposition to this idea, and particularly the opposition that plays out along nationalist lines is 
interesting for the purposes of this thesis. In the words of Boyenga Bofala,  
 For some time now, an instinctive call has been emerging from the people of the Congo for  
 the defense of national unity and safeguarding of the territorial integrity of the Congo, our  
 motherland. This unanimous call, which is an expression of a deep feeling within the heart  
 of every Congolese, can only be explained through the historical education of a genuine   
 patriotism, never polluted, which even at the time of forgetfulness, despite current   
 insurmountable difficulties, makes the voice of the past speak softly, but steadily, of building 
 a Congo more beautiful than before [emphasis in the original] within the borders resulting  
 from colonization since 1885.  88
This evidence could possibly be regarded as insubstantial, given that it is written from the 
perspective of a single author, but it does point to a larger truth which is supported by more 
sources,  namely that in contemporary DRC there still exists a lingering sense of nationalism that 89
can quite likely be attributed to Mobutu. While the current leadership is just as hungry for power as 
its predecessors, and will only take steps to include different ethnicities within the country's 
bureaucratic structure once it is pressured to do so by the international community, it would seem as 
if it is the will of the Congolese people themselves that still holds the country together. 
 As far as Kimbanguism is concerned, we can be relatively brief about the religion's 
contemporary position in Congolese society. The record shows us that it still enjoys a large 
following, and since the current government no longer chastises certain religions for their influence 
and sway over the population, Kimbanguism no longer benefits from a beneficial standing with the 
authorities. Nonetheless, it continues to fulfill its primary function of bringing people together, even 
when the church is still mainly aimed at Kikongo speakers hailing from the southwest of the DRC. 
 Frédéric Boyenga Bofala, "The Attempt to Balkanize the Democratic Republic of Congo: a Revisionism of the Uti 88
Possidetis Juris Principle That Is Dangerous for Africa", Mokengeli, accessed March 22, 2018, http://
www.mokengeli.com/information-politique/the-attempt-to-balkanize-the-democratic-republic-of-congo-dangerous-for-
africa/.
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This is emblematic of the different churches' societal role in the DRC, and it would therefore be 
justified to call the churches the salvagers of the nationalist ideal. 
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Conclusion 
 In spite of the grand designs a dictator the likes of Mobutu Sese Seko may have for his 
country, the famous saying "absolute power corrupts absolutely" still holds true. The statistics speak 
in favor of a profitable future for the DRC, but it is the political and military situation on the ground 
that keeps on standing in the way of these statistics fulfill their potential. Mobutu's extensive reign 
is characterized by patronage, corruption, and bribery, all of which contributed to the destruction of 
the Zairean economy. The ideology of Mobutism, along with the program of Authenticité, is often 
mentioned in the same negative light. While it was certainly radical in its aims, it did instill the 
Zaireans with a sense of what it meant to be Zairean, and assisted in building a vision that Zaire 
could survive on its own, without help or intervention from abroad. In this, the Mobutu regime did 
have a competitor in the form of the Catholic church. In order to combat the criticism the Catholic 
church often issued in the direction of the regime, the MPR was often elevated to the level of a 
church in the political discourse, and Mobutu was portrayed as its messiah. In collaboration with the 
JMPR, which as a youth wing served to inculcate the young Zairean minds with the lessons of 
Mobutism, Mobutu and his party created a totalitarian state that, in the end, laid a decisive 
fundament in the construction of a Zairean identity.  
 It was the Catholic church, however, that was far more effective in providing service to the 
people who need it most. Perhaps one of the only positive legacies of the colonial era, the Church 
by far outperformed the state in areas such as health and education, and still continues to do so. 
Mobutu's reign came to an end in 1997, but the Church continues still plays a role of vital 
importance in the Congo as a whole, and particularly in the Kivu area, where conflict may once 
again erupt on any given day. Mobutu was in some ways jealous of the efficacy of the Church, 
evidenced by his struggle to shut it down, but the fact that the Church already had a large base of 
believers before the start of his dictatorial reign was quite likely a factor of importance in Mobutu's 
failure to close the Church for good. Interestingly enough, the Kimbanguist church, did not follow 
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the same trajectory. One would be mistaken to believe that Mobutu undertook an offensive against 
all forms of religion. As he sought to root out any foreign influence on Zairean culture with 
Authenticité, he deemed the Kimbanguist church to be authentically Zairean from the outset, which 
assisted its survival throughout the years. While in contemporary Congo, its believers are mostly 
concentrated within a certain areas of the country, its societal impact is still enormous. The same 
goes for the Catholic church, which still enjoys a lot of visibility and popularity, and will continue 
to unite Catholic Congolese, regardless of their ethnicity, in the foreseeable future. According to 
Manson, "In Congo, people put far more faith in churches — of which there are probably hundreds 
… — than they do in the state. They are the heart of culture, authority, and sometimes politics in the 
country."  90
 The concept of ethnicity stands at the core of modern-day strifes such as the Kivu conflict 
and the Ituri conflict, with each side harboring notorious war criminals that seemingly make a 
peaceful future impossible. As for the politico-military details, many sensible solutions have been 
proposed, for instance by Orogun, who writes that "the panacea to the Congolese crisis lies in the 
domain of the politics of ethnic accommodation, political pluralism, and decentralization of power 
from the central government to provincial administrations. Power-sharing, federalism, restoration of 
civil society, and demilitarization of the body politic are crucial for a lasting peace and the return of 
political stability to the DRC."  The popular opinion in the DRC is still against the end-all solution 91
proposed by the international community, namely that of Balkanization. Based off of this, we may 
infer that the idea of a unified DRC still overrides the singular ethnicities of the warring parties. The 
Zairean/Congolese identity can, in this regard, be likened to an elastic band: it will stretch when 
conflict arises, but it will never snap. It remains difficult, however, to ascertain whether Mobutism 
 Katrina Manson, "Sounds of Kinshasa: Music, Dance, and Culture Are a Lifeline in Congo", Financial Times, 90
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or the churches had a stronger influence in the identity formation process. At the very least, both 
Mobutism and the Catholic church can be credited for still holding the nation together, and 
preventing it from becoming a definitive failed state.  
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Appendices 
Appendix 1. Growth of the churches in Africa over time as a proportion of the total population 
(numbers in millions). Adapted from: Bengt Sundkler and Christopher Steed, A History of the 
Church in Africa (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 906. 
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